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Scalable Authentication of MPEG-4 Streams
Yongdong Wu and Robert H. Deng
Abstract—This paper presents three scalable and efficient
schemes for authenticating MPEG-4 streams: the Flat Authen-
tication Scheme, the Progressive Authentication Scheme, and
the Hierarchical Authentication Scheme. All the schemes allow
authentication of MPEG-4 streams over lossy networks by inte-
grating seamlessly digital signatures and erasure correction coding
with MPEG-4’s fine granular scalability. A prominent feature of
our schemes is their “sign once, verify many ways” property, i.e.,
they generate only one digital signature per compressed MPEG-4
object group, but allow clients to verify the authenticity of any
down-scaled version of the original signed object group.
Index Terms—Authentication, digital signature, erasure correc-
tion coding, fine granular scalability, Merkle hash tree, MPEG-4.
I. INTRODUCTION
M PEG-4 [1], [2] is a state-of-the-art multimedia pro-cessing technology that encompasses a wide range of
tools and techniques. It not only deals with media compression
but also covers media packaging and delivery, including de-
livery multimedia integration framework (DMIF) [3] and fine
granular scalability (FGS) [4], as well as intellectual property
management and protection (IPMP) [5].
DMIF is a generic multimedia platform for delivering syn-
chronized and multiplexed media object streams. In DMIF, a
large number of clients can access MPEG-4 media at any time
and from anywhere, based on their preferences, communication
channel characteristics, and device capabilities.
FGS is adopted by the MPEG-4 standard for efficient and
flexible distribution of multimedia over heterogeneous wired
and wireless networks [6]–[8]. FGS provides a down-scaling
mechanism which adapts MPEG-4 media to network traffic
and/or consumer device resource.
IPMP is a secure delivery framework which enables content
providers to select and configure the most effective and appro-
priate tools for content protection. Currently, IPMP only pro-
vides provisions for elementary stream identification. It does not
provide mechanisms for media stream authentication. However,
authentication (including data integrity) of MPEG-4 stream is
indispensable in certain applications, such as government, fi-
nance, health care and law. It is well known that using encryp-
tion without adequate integrity protection is vulnerable to ac-
tive attacks [9] and it is believed that integrity service must
be offered in any security-aware transmission [10]. Therefore,
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techniques for authenticating MPEG-4 streams are crucial for
MPEG-4 to be used in security sensitive applications.
This paper proposes three authentication schemes for
MPEG-4: the flat authentication scheme (FAS), the progressive
authentication scheme (PAS), and the hierarchical authen-
tication scheme (HAS). All the three schemes perform the
following operations: 1) video objects are assembled into ob-
ject groups and each object group is encapsulated into a packet
group; 2) one digital signature per packet group is produced
on the hash values of packets in the packet group; 3) erasure
correction codewords are generated from the signature and
hash values of packets which are then amortized into the
packets; 4) a proxy in the distribution network down-scales an
object group based on the priorities of the objects and produces
patches which are piggybacked onto the packets; and 5) clients
verify the authenticity of the source of the received packets.
In this framework, the critical issue is how to manage packet
authentication. FAS manages the authentication issue using an
incremental hash function, PAS does it based on a progressive
hash function, and HAS deals with the problem employing a
hash tree. Since the proposed schemes seamlessly integrate
stream authentication with erasure correction coding, as well as
with an unequal protection technique based on object priorities,
they can tolerate packet loss while still achieve authentication
with low overhead. Additionally, the schemes exploit the FGS
property of MPEG-4 so that they are able to authenticate
down-scaled object groups with only one digital signature per
object group. That is, they allow proxies to down-scale object
groups such that clients can verify the authenticity of the source
of any down-scaled streams.
A. Related Works
To cater for the FGS property of MPEG-4, Achir et al. [11]
proposed two MPEG-4 delivery algorithms which are able
to adapt to time-varying multicast networks. The first algo-
rithm, namely Layer-based Priority, maintains the best possible
quality for each video object. The second algorithm, called
Object-based Priority, guarantees the best possible quality
for the most important object but coarsely degrades the less
important objects of a video stream. Yuan et al. [12] provided
a method for scalable encryption of MPEG-4 streams. Venka-
tramani et al. [13] designed ARMS so as to provide secure
end-to-end MPEG-4 based streaming. However, the previous
efforts did not take stream authentication into consideration.
A straightforward stream authentication technique is to ap-
pend a digital signature to each packet. This naïve solution not
only introduces high computational overhead (e.g., it requires
4.65 ms to generate a 1024-bit RSA signature with a 2.1-GHz
Pentium 4 processor [14]), but also large communication over-
head. In addition, FGS makes stream authentication even more
1520-9210/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
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challenging because it allows MPEG-4 streams to be modi-
fied intentionally and legally. We note that letting intermediate
servers to sign down-scaled streams is impractical and insecure.
Miner and Staddon [15] proposed to authenticate digital
streams over a lossy network based on a packet-dependent
graph. Their authentication scheme tolerates random packet
loss given that each packet is independently lost with the same
probability. However, the scheme is not applicable for scalable
stream authentication.
Park et al. [16] constructed an authentication scheme SAIDA
by encoding the hash values of packets and the signature on a
packet group with an erasure correction coding algorithm. Their
method amortizes codewords for packet hash values and packet
group signature among all the packets so as to reduce space
overhead and increase tolerance of packet loss. Once sufficient
number of packets are received, the receiver starts to recover
the signature and check authenticity of the packets. Pannetrat
et al. [17] improved SAIDA by constructing a systematic era-
sure code to reduce the packet overhead. We extend Pannetrat’s
approach to provide flexible authentication of MPEG-4 streams.
Wu and Deng [18] also extended the scheme in [16] but
focused on the semantical authenticity of Motion JPEG2000
streams. They did not consider the effect of down-scaling
operations which is one of the main concerns in this paper.
A number of other cryptographic based stream authentication
schemes have been studied, the reader is directed to [19]–[26]
for technical details.
A watermark based stream authentication scheme was pro-
posed by Lin and Chang [27]. The scheme extracts the invariable
features to reject malicious tampering but accept nonmalicious
modifications. However, it is in general hard to measure the dis-
tortion formally because the criteria itself is subjective. Further-
more, this scheme is vulnerable to known-plaintext attack.
B. Outline
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II in-
troduces preliminaries. The underlying framework of the pro-
posed stream authentication schemes is addressed in Section III.
Sections IV–VI elaborate on the details of our three authentica-
tion schemes, respectively. Section VII contains the security and
performance analysis. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
To make the paper self contained, this section introduces
the basic concepts of one-way hash function, digital signa-
ture, Merkle hash tree, erasure correction coding (ECC), and
MPEG-4.
A. One-Way Hash Function
A hash function takes a variable-length input string and con-
verts it to a fixed-length output string, called a hash value. A
one-way hash function, denoted as , is a hash function that
works in one direction: it is easy to compute a hash value
from a pre-image ; however, it is hard to find a pre-image
that hashes to a particular hash value. There are believe-to-be
one-way hash functions, such as SHA [28].
Fig. 1. Example Merkle hash tree where d = H(n k i), i = 1; 2; . . . ; 8.
B. Digital Signature
A digital signature algorithm is a cryptographic tool for gen-
erating nonrepudiation evidence, authenticating the integrity as
well as the origin of the signed message. In a digital signature
algorithm, a signer keeps a private key and publishes the
corresponding public key . The private key is used by the
signer to generate a digital signature on a message based
on a signature generation function , and the
public key is used by anyone to verify the signature on the
message based on a verification function .
The digital signature algorithms widely used in practice include
RSA [29] and DSA [30].
C. The Merkle Hash Tree
The Merkle hash tree finds many applications, e.g., [31]–[35].
We illustrate the construction and application of the Merkle hash
tree with a simple example. The reader is referred to [36] for de-
tailed descriptions. To authenticate data values ,
the data source constructs the Merkle hash tree as depicted in
Fig. 1 assuming that . Each node in the tree is assigned
a value. The values of the 8 leaf nodes are the hash values,
, , of the data values under a
one-way hash function , where “ ” denotes concatenation.
The value of each internal node of the tree is derived from its
child nodes. For example, the values of node and node are
and , respectively. The
value of node is . The data source com-
pletes the construction of the tree recursively from the leaf nodes
to the root node.
The value of the root node is which
is used to commit to the entire tree; it can be used to authenti-
cate any subset of the data values , in conjunction
with a small amount of auxiliary information. For example, a
client, who is assumed to have the authentic root value , re-
quests for and requires the authentication of the received .
Besides , the source sends the auxiliary information ,
and to the client. The client can then check the authenticity
of the received as follows. The client first computes and
and then checks if the latter is
the same as the root value . If this check is positive, the client
accepts . In general, to authenticate the data value , the aux-
iliary information include the values of all the sibling nodes of
those nodes on the path from the leaf node to the root.
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D. Erasure Correction Coding
Generally, network errors include packet loss and packet data
errors. However, in MPEG-4 stream applications, only packet
loss is considered because packet data errors are detected with
packet checksum and thus packets with errors are dropped,
which results in lost packets at the end users. Furthermore, since
packet identification can be used to locate missing packets, sys-
tematic ECC is a good means for error resilience in our context.
An ECC scheme consists of an encoder module and a
decoder module. The encoder module accepts a message of
symbols over the finite field and outputs a codeword
of symbols. Assuming that the minimum Hamming distance
of the code is . Then the decoder module is able to recover the
original message symbols given any symbols in a
received codeword [37]. In ECC, an appropriate
generator matrix is selected such that any rows of form
a nonregular matrix. A systematic ECC requires the first
rows of be an identity matrix, i.e.,
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where [37], [38]. Denote a message as
, for all ,
the corresponding codeword is given by
, where ,
are parity symbols. In this paper, we assume that
the ECC scheme is maximum distance separable, i.e., its
minimum Hamming distance [37]. Then given
any or more symbols in a received codeword, the decoder
outputs the original message of symbols.
E. Syntactic Structure of MPEG-4
According to [1], [39], an MPEG-4 presentation is divided
into sessions including units of aural, visual, or audiovisual con-
tent, called media objects. As shown in Fig. 2, a video sequence
or group includes a series of video objects (VOs). Each VO
is encoded in one or more video object layers (VOLs). Each
layer includes information corresponding to a given level of
temporal and spatial resolution, so that scalable transmission
and storage are possible. Each VOL contains a sequence of
two-dimensional (2-D) representations of arbitrary shapes at
different time intervals that is referred to as a video object plane
(VOP). Video object planes are divided further into macroblocks
(MBs) of size 16 16. Each macroblock is encoded into six
blocks of size 8 8 when a 4:2:0 format is
applied.
In a MPEG-4 stream, video objects, such as foreground ob-
jects and background objects, may have different priorities, in-
dicated as visual_object_priority taking values 1–7 from the
lowest to the highest priority. In the MPEG-4 syntax, each ob-
ject layer has visual_object_layer_priority to represent the im-
portance of different layers. The layer with the highest priority,
Fig. 2. Syntactic structure of an example MPEG-4 visual stream. This stream
includes v objects, each object has two VOLs, each VOL includes two VOPs
and each VOP is segmented into two macroblocks.
Fig. 3. Content distribution framework where a transmission path may include
many proxies.
called the base layer, contains data representing the most im-
portant features of the video sequence, while additional layers,
called enhancement layers, assigned with progressively lower
priorities, contain data that further refines the quality of the base
layer. The source generates a flow for each layer and assigns to
it a unique discarding priority.
III. FRAMEWORK OF PROPOSED SCHEMES
A. Problem Definition
Fig. 3 illustrates the generic parties involved in the con-
tent dissemination process. A producer generates a protected
MPEG-4 stream and disseminates it to the sellers (e.g., edge
servers of a content distribution network); each seller passes
the content to proxies in one or more transmission stages. This
process continues till the stream arrives at the clients. In this
framework, only the producer is assumed to be trustworthy. For
instance, only the certified public key of a digital video camera
is available and trusted in a real-time monitoring application.
In packet lossy networks such as Internet, packet loss in-
creases the difficulty of authenticating streams. Packet loss
comes from three main sources:
• a proxy discards unimportant content intentionally so as
to meet the network and client device requirements;
• a router discards packets due to network limitation;
• a receiver discards packets which fail checksum verifica-
tions. Although error resilience methods (e.g., [40]–[42])
for MPEG-4 video streams over the Internet have been
proposed for video quality, packet loss still happens from
time to time.
The objective of a stream authentication scheme is, with high
probability and using as fewer signatures as possible, to au-
thenticate packets received over a lossy network. Accordingly,
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a stream authentication scheme for MPEG-4 should answer the
following questions: How to reduce the computational and com-
munication cost? How to increase the probability of successful
authentication in case of packet loss? How to manage data re-
moval at proxies so as to allow successful authentication?
B. Overview of the Proposed Schemes
Following the approaches in [19]–[26], our schemes divide
a stream into groups of packets (e. g., grouping packets corre-
sponding to a certain video duration). To facilitate down-scaling
operation at proxies, a packet group includes data of one or more
VOs. Because groups are processed independently, we focus
on one packet group in the following. In our schemes, the
producer signs on the hash value of the group, instead of on
each packet separately. The group hash is generated such that
recipients are able to verify the source of a down-scaled stream.
The time to run signing and verifying algorithms, as well as the
authentication data, are amortized over many packets. Conse-
quently, this approach keeps the authentication overhead low.
To achieve packet loss resilience with small communication
overhead, the objects, and/or layers are given unequal protection
levels [43]. That is, the higher priority of an object/layer is, the
more parity symbols are used to protect it. To ensure that the
highest priority layer (i. e., the base layer) be always verifiable,
the signature is protected at the same level as the highest priority
layer.
Because FGS is used in MPEG-4 streaming, a proxy dis-
cards data layers from the lowest priority layer to higher priority
layers until the resource requirement is met. This down-scaling
strategy is different from the packet dropping method adopted
in [44]. Because the down-scaled stream can tolerate the same
number of packet losses as the original stream, the error-re-
silience capability is not decreased. Thus, a client is able to
verify authenticity of the packet origin even if the stream is
down-scaled. Of course this assumes that proxies are aware of
the presence of the authentication mechanisms.
Briefly, the proposed authentication schemes work as follows
(refer to Fig. 4).
• The producer encodes video objects according to the
MPEG-4 standard.
• The producer prepares packets for an object group based
on the priorities of video objects and layers.
• The producer generates authentication data including
packet hashes and a signature. The authentication data is
piggybacked/appended onto the packets. The protected
stream is then disseminated over the network.
• To meet the requirement of the network bandwidth or
the client device capability, proxies may down-scale the
stream in such a way that the authenticity of the down-
scaled stream remains verifiable at clients.
• A client recovers the signature and packet hashes, and ver-
ifies the received stream. Only when a packet is authentic,
the client will accept and decode it.
Fig. 4. Process of stream authentication.
Fig. 5. Packaging of an object group where data units in the same column
forms a packet, while data units in the same row form a layer.
IV. FLAT AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
In the flat authentication scheme (FAS), a proxy can dis-
card any number of VOs, VOLs, VOPs, macroblocks, blocks
or their arbitrary combinations, but the authenticity proof is
still valid and the authentication overhead is kept constant. In
Sections IV-A–E, we describe FAS according to the framework
shown in Section III.
A. Packaging an Object Group
Layers in an object group are arranged based on a prede-
fined style [43]. Fig. 5 illustrates the arrangement of a group of
objects. Objects are encapsulated into packets (i.e., columns)
, where packet consists of data units ,
, with being the number of layers. In Fig. 5
data are protected unequally with the shaded areas representing
parity units. That is, important layers consist of more parity units
and less important layers have less parity units.
B. Generating Signature on an Object Group
To achieve maximum flexibility, we make use of a commu-
nicative function to generate packet hashes. Formally
for any , . We select the incremental hash algo-
rithm AdHASH in [45] due to its efficiency. Thus, the incre-
mental hash of packet is
(1)
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Fig. 6. Process to generate integrity-protected packets.
where is the hash value of data unit in packet
(2)
We define the packet hash of as
(3)
and the hash value of the object group as
(4)
where is the identification of the group and is the
identification of the stream (e.g., video number). Note that the
packet index and and the group identification are inserted
into (3) and (4), respectively, so as to defeat a counterfeiting at-
tack [46]. Finally, the producer signs on the group hash using
its private key to obtain the signature .
C. Encoding and Encapsulating
After generating the signature, ECC encoders are employed
to encode the signature and packet hashes so as to tolerate packet
losses (see Fig. 6).
1) Generate a codeword
, where
is a systematic ECC algorithm with sym-
bols over field , is the number of packets
in a group, and is the minimum number of expected
received packets.
2) Divide the concatenation into
symbols , . With the ECC
algorithm, a codeword is
produced. Denote the symbols in the codeword as
integrity units .
3) Similarly, divide the signature into symbols of
the same size, . . Then
encode the signature to produce a signature codeword
. Denote the symbols in
the codeword as signature units .
4) Append integrity unit and signature unit to the orig-
inal packet , for all . That is, the new
packet now consists of , and .
Fig. 7 illustrates the packet structure of the protected ob-
ject group.
D. Down-Scaling Objects
After generating the protected object group, the producer
sends protected packets over the content dis-
tribution network. As mentioned previously, a proxy may need
to customize the object stream so as to adapt it to the available
Fig. 7. Packet structure of the protected object group.
Fig. 8. Down-scaled object group where the third row contains the patch
values.
network bandwidth. In this case, the proxy may discard unim-
portant layers. How to select the down-scaling layers is beyond
the scope of this paper. To prove the source of the down-scaled
object group to clients, for each packet, the proxy sums the
hashes of the discarded data units, and inserts the summation
into the packet. Specifically, if layers are
discarded by a proxy, a patch value
(5)
is inserted into packet , for all . Albeit (5) indi-
cates the contiguous layers being removed, FAS is applicable to
random layer removal given that the receiver is acknowledged
with the identities of the removed layers. If more than one proxy
down-scale the objects, the new patch will be added to the old
one, and the overhead will be kept constant. Fig. 8 demonstrates
the down-scaled protected group due to removable of all objects
but and (four layers) by a proxy.
E. Verifying Packets
The verification process basically reverses the generation
process for a protected object group. Based on the erasure
coding, at least packets of a group should be received in order
to recover the signature and packet hash values. Without loss
of generality, suppose the first packets are
received successfully. With respect to Fig. 9, the client retrieves
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Fig. 9. Process of recovering the packet hashes.
the integrity units from the received packets and
using the decoding algorithm to recover
, or . From the
received packets, the client calculates
and then using
to obtain the hash value corresponding to packet ,
. The reconstructed hash for the group is
Meanwhile, signature units are retrieved too.
With the decoder , the signature for the
group is reconstructed. Therefore, the signature can be verified
against with algorithm , where is the
authentic public key of the producer. If does not match with
, the object group is considered forged and discarded.
V. PROGRESSIVE AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
FAS is flexible in that it allows a proxy to discard any layers
while still ensures that the authenticity of the dow-scaled object
group is verifiable at the clients. However, FAS is only viable
when an adversary eavesdrops the network, drops packets, or
modify the packets randomly, as we will discuss in Section VII.
To foil a strong adversary who is able to control the network,
AcHASH [47]1, instead of AdHASH, can be employed for gen-
erating packet hashes. Although AcHASH is secure, it is how-
ever computationally very expensive.
In this section, we propose the PAS which is built upon
a progressive hash function based on the layered structure
of MPEG-4. Similar to FAS, PAS encapsulates objects into
packets as shown in Fig. 5. Recall that the layout in Fig. 5 is
based on the priorities of layers, i.e., layer has higher priority
than layer . The layer containing is the most important
layer, while the layer containing is the least important
layer. Because the layers are totally ordered, it makes sense to
discard layer ahead of layer if a down-scaling operation
is necessary.
1AcHASH is a one-way accumulator defined as f(x ; x ; . . . ; x ) =
a mod N , where a is a constant and N is the product of two large
primes.
A. Generating Signature on an Object Group
We define the progressive hash of the packet as
(6)
where the priority of data unit is higher than the priority of
data unit , . The steps for signature gen-
erating and encapsulating are the same as those in Section IV-C.
B. Down-Scaling Objects
After generating the protected object group, the producer
sends packets over the content distribution
network. When several layers are removed at a proxy, the hash
values of the discarded layers are inserted into the packets.
Specifically, if layers are removed, the patch
value for packet is
for all . The proxy inserts the patch to the cor-
responding packet . The data structure of the protected group
generated with PAS is the same as that generated with FAS ex-
cept that the patch values are different (see Fig. 8). If more than
one proxy down-scale the objects, the new patch will replace the
old one, and the payload will not increase.
C. Verifying Packets
To verify the authenticity of a down-scaled object group, a
client recovers the signature and hash values of all packets.
This process is the same as that in FAS except that the process
to recompute the hash value of a packet is different. If layers
are removed, the hash value for packet can
be recovered from
(7)
where is the patch value extracted from the packet . The
rest of the verification process is the same as in Section IV-E.
VI. HIERARCHICAL AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
FAS is flexible but subject to attacks by malicious proxies.
On the other hand, PAS is secure against malicious proxies (see
Section VII) but requires that the layers be totally ordered. This
total ordering requirement may not be met for certain appli-
cations, e.g., applications where some objects have the same
priority. The HAS proposed in this section combines the advan-
tages of FAS and PAS so as to provide a secure and flexible so-
lution. HAS packages data units as FAS, but uses an object tree
other than FAS’s linear structure to manage packet integrity. In
the general object tree structure shown in Fig. 2, the first layer
corresponds to VO, the following layers to VOL, VOP, MB,
and the leaf layer to blocks. HAS uses a tree which arranges
VOLs/VOs based on their priority levels. Each object VO cor-
responds to an object subtree and all the object subtrees form
the complete object group tree. Subtrees of objects with lower
priority levels are placed as child subtrees of objects with higher
priority levels. Within an object subtree, each object layer VOL
corresponds to an object layer subtree. Subtrees of object layers
158 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MULTIMEDIA, VOL. 8, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2006
Fig. 10. Tree structure for the layers based on priorities. The dashed frames
are covering-subtrees, which may be removed by a proxy.
with lower priority layers are arranged as child subtrees of ob-
ject layers of lower priority levels. An example object group
hash tree is depicted in Fig. 10. Note that there might be spe-
cific variations of the tree structure for specific applications. For
example, if no cut operation is permitted, nodes correspond to
macroblocks will be the leaf nodes.
A. Generating Signature on an Object Group
After defining the object group tree structure, the nodes in the
tree will be assigned values recursively as the Merkle hash tree.
First, leaf node values are generated with formula (2). Then, the
value of a nonleaf node is the hash value of its child node
values
where is the number of child nodes, and is the value of the
child node .
For example, assume ’s in Fig. 10 are within the same
packets, then the node hash values are given by
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
and the packet hash is given by
(13)
where (8) computes the hash of each block, (9) calculates the
hash of each macroblock and (11) and (12) calculate, respec-
tively, the hashes of each object layer and object recursively.
Finally, the object group hash is
Fig. 11. Down-scaled object group. OnlyVOL of object V is not removed.
HV and HVL are hash values of covering-subtree for the discarded layers.
Fig. 12. Packet structure of a down-scaled object group. Only the most
important layer of the most important object is kept.
The producer now signs the group hash using its private
key to obtain the signature . The process
of encapsulating signature and packet integrity is the same as
those in Section IV-C except that the integrity unit is gener-
ated from the hash of the leaves in Fig. 10 instead of the data
unit. Therefore, it is clean to encapsulate leaf values in packets.
B. Down-Scaling Objects
Define a covering-subtree as a subtree which includes a set of
leaf nodes and only those leaf nodes. If a proxy removes layers,
it will replace the layers with the hash value of the covering
sub-tree in order for clients to verify authenticity. Referring to
Fig. 11, all the objects but object are removed from all the
packets, and all the VOLs of the object but the base layer
are removed. In the corresponding hash tree, their hash
values are used to replace the sub-trees derived from the layer
data. Fig. 12 illustrates the data structure of a down-scaled object
group. and are the hashes of the new leaves shown
in Fig. 11. To prove the authenticity of the down-scaled groups,
the proxy will re-encode the hashes of the new tree leaves so as
to generate the new which replaces the old integrity unit .
C. Verifying Packets
After recovering the signature and the hash values of a
packet, the client reconstructs the tree of the packet layers, e.g.,
the tree shown in Fig. 11. Then the client computes the hash
value of the hash tree according to formulas (8)–(13). If some
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layers are removed, the hash value of the covering-subtree is
used as the value of the node. The rest of the verification process
is similar to that in Section IV-E.
VII. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE
In this section, we study the performance of the proposed
schemes in terms of authentication probability, security, and
computational cost. FAS is efficient in both storage and trans-
mission. It also allows proxies to down-scale MPEG-4 streams
in a flexible manner, but is only suitable for applications with
moderate security requirement. PAS provides strong security
protection but it requires that all layers be totally ordered so that
layers can be down-scaled/removed by proxies in a predefined
way. HAS provides both high security and great flexibility.
A. Authentication Probability
To provide reasonably high probability of successful authen-
tication, an authentication scheme must have high probability
of correctly receiving and verifying the base layer. Thus, the
number of parity units for base layer should not be less than
that for the signature; meanwhile, if the signature codeword
has more parity units than that of base layer, then the signature
is over protected. Thus, the number of parity units for signa-
ture and base layer should be the same. Assume that the packet
losses are independent, then the received packets can be veri-
fied with probability 2, where is the
packet loss probability. To provide a concrete evaluation of the
authentication probabilities, we use the experiment results from
[48, Table II] where the stationary packet loss probability
. The received packets will be verified to be authentic as
long as the number of lost packets . Then the authen-
tication probability is given by
Assuming a video rate of 25 frames/s and each frame is encap-
sulated in a packet, Fig. 13 illustrates the authentication proba-
bilities for packet groups of size , 200 and 400 (i.e, 4 s,
8 s, and 16 s durations), respectively, given that the packet loss
rate is . Let be a measure of coding
redundance. First, we observe that for a fixed number of parity
packets , the authentication probability decreases as the
group size increases. This is understandable since when
is fixed, a larger corresponds to a smaller coding redundance.
The more interesting observation is that we can achieve high
authentication probabilities with small coding redundances. For
example, the authentication probability is above 0.98 when is
about 5% for and 200.
B. Security
In the following, we assume that the underlying one-way
hash function and the producer’s signature scheme are se-
2For easy estimation of authentication probability, assume that each packet
encapsulates the same number of leaves in the HAS tree.
Fig. 13. Authentication probabilities versus number of parity packets.
cure. Moreover, the producer’s public key is disseminated
to clients in an authenticated manner.
1) Security of FAS: Packet hash values in FAS are computed
using an incremental hash algorithm AdHASH [see (1)]. Since
the hash algorithm is communicative, FAS allows a proxy to
discard any layers and compute the corresponding patch values
such that the down-scaled packet group remains verifiable at
the clients. However, this same flexibility provides adversaries,
such a malicious proxy, to forge data without being detected. To
see this, let us consider packet in Fig. 7 whose incremental
hash is given by (1). Assuming that layers
are discarded by a proxy. According to FAS, the proxy com-
putes a patch value given by (5). Obviously, we have
. Now assuming that the proxy
is malicious. The proxy modifies the undiscarded data units, say
replacing with . The proxy computes
and the “patch value” , where is
again given by (5). When this down-scaled packet is received by
a client, the packet will pass verification since
. It should be noted that to launch this at-
tack, the attacker needs to get control of a proxy or edge server
in the content distribution network. Therefore, FAS provides a
moderate level of security and is suitable for scenarios where
the proxies are trusted not to diverge from the correct protocol
operation.
2) Security of PAS: PAS employs a progressive hash func-
tion in computing the packet hash value as shown in (6). Due to
the recursive hash operations of the progressive hash function,
the above attack to FAS by a malicious proxy is computationally
impossible in PAS. Note that the malicious proxy attack is an
“insider attack” and is the most powerful attack to our applica-
tion scenario. Other attacks such as content removal, re-arrange-
ment, and modification by third parties can by detected as long
as the underlying hash function and the signature scheme are
secure. Authentication of origin of the content also depends on
the authenticated dissemination of the producer’s public key to
clients, a necessary requirement in any signature based authen-
tication schemes. We note that to facilitate packet hash compu-
tation, and therefore packet verification, layers in PAS must be
discarded in a pre-determined manner (e. g., from the lowest pri-
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ority layer to the higher priority layers) during the down-scale
operation at a proxy.
3) Security of HAS: The security of HAS depends on the se-
curity of the Merkle hash tree. The Merkle hash tree can prevent
an adversary, who impersonates as the producer, from sending
forged data to the client. With reference to Fig. 1, an adver-
sary impersonating as the source can not sends a forged to
the client, because he cannot find , and such that
. Based on the
same argument, the Merkle hash tree can also detect modifica-
tions made by any third party, including the proxies, as long as
the producer’s signature scheme and the underlying hash func-
tion are secure. More details about the security of the Merkle
hash tree are described in [36].
C. Computational Cost
A producer is required to prepare protected streams, including
encoding, packaging and signing. The task of a proxy is only to
down-scale the objects and generate the packet patches. This
lightweight task enables the proxy to process many simulta-
neous requirements from different clients. A client has to spend
time in verifying the packets and decoding the objects. In the
following, we study the cost related to security and ignore the
cost due to object encoding/decoding.
Based on (2) and (3), (6) and (8)–(13), the number of hash
operations per packet are , and roughly for FAS,
PAS and HAS, respectively, at the producer side. The compu-
tational cost at a proxy is linear with the number of removed
layers. The client will spend time to reconstruct the hash value
of each packet. Loosely speaking, the total cost of the proxy and
the client for computing the packet hashes is equal to that of
the producer. The computational cost for signature verification
at the client can be minimized by careful selection of crypto-
graphic parameters. For example, the signature verification time
is only 4% of the signature generation time when the public ex-
ponent is 17 in the RSA signature scheme.
VIII. CONCLUSION
MPEG-4 is the latest media stream processing standard
which possesses the important “compress once, decompress
many ways” property, i.e., it allows users to extract any se-
quence of low quality streams from a single compressed stream.
In this paper, we have presented three scalable authentication
schemes for MPEG-4 streams in multicast and lossy networks.
The first scheme, FAS, is the simplest, provides the maximum
flexibility, and is suitable for applications requiring region crop-
ping. However, it provides only moderate security. The second
scheme, PAS, has strong security strength, but it requires the
object data to be totally ordered. Therefore, PAS is the first
choice for stream applications which require bit-plane based
down-scaling only. The third scheme, HAS, is secure against
active attacks, is flexible and has low authentication overhead.
Our schemes share the novel property of “sign once, verify
many ways”. That is, they allow clients to verify the authenticity
of down-scaled streams extracted from a single compressed
MPEG-4 object group protected with a single digital signa-
ture. We note that our group-based streaming authentication
framework requires more buffer space in client devices than
unprotected MPEG-4 streaming applications. How to mini-
mize buffer space and yet still achieve efficient authenticated
streaming over lossy networks is an open problem.
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